


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1962 US-USSR Understanding

- You had flagged this for a Vance meeting some time ago, but never got around to it at your last regular meeting (Oct 79) or the last meeting (Feb 80, requested by Vance).
 - Per Helene Boatner the request is still valid
 - Either a written "understanding"
 - Or a written record of an oral "understanding"
- (Difficult to monitor any agreement, the details of which we do not know.)

Vance agenda

26 JUL 1979

79-1755

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Director, National Foreign Assessment Center

FROM : Helene L. Boatner
Director, Political Analysis

SUBJECT : The 1962 US-Soviet Understanding--
A Record?

1. Action Requested. This is to request that you ask Doctor Brzezinski and possibly Secretary of State Vance to settle once and for all the question of whether there exists any document that is accepted by the US and the Soviet Union as the definitive text of what has been known since the Cuban Missile Crisis as the "1962 Understanding."

2. Background. Our current concern over the presence of an organic Soviet combat unit in Cuba raises again the question of whether a definitive written record exists. In reviewing the testimony of both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in the current SALT II hearings, we are struck by the flat-out declarative way in which both talk about the "Understanding" as though they had a firmer appreciation of it than we in the Intelligence Community have been able to assert. Perhaps we are mistaken in thinking that there exists a written record, an Aide Memoire, or an initialed Memo of Understanding, but we need to know.

3. For almost 17 years, spokesmen for the White House and the Department of State have denied the existence of any such record--claiming that the only "Understanding" is to be

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SUBJECT: The 1962 US-Soviet Understanding--A Record?

found in the public exchanges between President Kennedy and Khrushchev and in a MFR recounting the meeting of the President and Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan on 29 November 1962. In the public exchanges of 22 and 28 October, the President demanded the removal of "offensive missile sites" for medium-range ballistic missiles effective up to 1,000 miles and for intermediate-range ballistic missiles with over 2,000 mile range, and of "jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons" for which "the necessary bases are being prepared;" and Khrushchev agreed to "dismantle the arms which you described as offensive and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." In their private meeting, Mikoyan pressed the President for a public pledge that the US would not invade Cuba, while the Chief Executive sought on-site inspection of the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Because Mikoyan would not concede on on-site inspection, the President would not yield more than a press conference statement that the US would take no punitive action against Castro as long as he did not seek to export revolution in the Hemisphere.

4. Neither the public exchange nor the Kennedy-Mikoyan conversation dealt with Soviet combat troops or submarines. Hence the KissingerDobrynin exchange on port calls in Cuba by Soviet nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines was separate and apart from the so-called "1962 Understanding," as Kissinger made clear to the press at the time.

5. On the public record, both the 1962 and 1970 exchanges are replete with ambiguities--ambiguities the Soviets probably would resist clarifying. The most recent and authoritative statement we have of their interpretation of the 1962 accord is Kosygin's statement on the occasion of the US protest over the delivery of the MIG-23s that the Soviets will deliver no nuclear weapons carriers to the Cubans.

Helene L. Boatner

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